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MUNICIPAL LAW
City of Ottawa v. Boyd Builders Ltd., [1965] S.C.R. 408.
MuNIcIPAL LAW RESTRICTIVE BY-LAws - BUILDING PERMITS MANDAmUS - DISCRETION TO ADJOURN - GOOD FAITH.

It may be very desirable that wherever possible before adopting or
amending by-laws, as those which by their very nature must interfere
with property rights, the council should guard against hasty and ill
considered changes, but, if it is assumed that the original by-law was
passed to further what was sincerely considered to be in the public
interest, it would appear to be not only the right but the duty of the
council to act promptly when it is convinced that the beneficial purpose
and intent of the original by-law
is endangered by unsuspected errors
or omissions in the enactment.1

The Supreme Court of Canada in City of Ottawa v. Boyd Builders
Ltd.'2 although confronted with a much litigated issue, rendered a
decision which appears to have formulated a new trend in the procedure of municipal law today. The decision of Spence, J. places a
definite limitation on the ability of a municipality to efficiently control
its zoning process and for this reason the decision must be examined
in some detail.
The factual situation in the Boyd case is reminiscent of several
earlier decisions of lower tribunals where the results were equally
divided. In essence, the issue involves a race between the land owner
and the municipality when the possibility of undesirable land development has been left unguarded. It has been said that "the race is to the
3
swift",

but it is questionable whether the courts should be the

stewards of such a race. This race represents a contest between an
individual's attempt to use the rights he has acquired through ownership of his land and the municipal authority's attempts to alter
society's requirements of land use in respect to the owners' property.
It has been well understood that the land owner cannot request
compensation solely because the municipality has failed to benefit
his land through the implementation of zoning laws which would have
increased the value of his property. The issue in this case, however,
concerns a land owner, who by relying on the municipality's zoning
laws (as represented to the land owner) has suffered a detriment
when the municipality later decides to alter its zoning requirements
and deprive the owner of his expectations concerning the use of his
property. Should the land owner in this case also be denied any right
to compensation for the loss he has suffered?
An analysis of the legislative intent with regard to the zoning
process would appear to reveal that even such a vested right or status
is not immune from attack, and such a right can be validly divested
by the exercise of the statutory zoning power without compensation
to the land owner.
1 Cummings, L. R., Q.C., Is Zoning Wagging the Dog, in MNER, J. B.,
CozmmNrrr PLAN NIG, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963) p. 680.
2 [19651 S.C.R. 408.
3 Be Upper Canada Estates Ltd. and MacNicoZ, [19311 O.R. 465.
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The decision of Spence, J. in this case appears to show clearly
that rights which have become vested are not subject to such treatment. However, the reasons for holding that the rights have become
vested as of the date of application have not been clearly expressed.
Was this a decision in regard to the zoning process or was it a matter
of affording compensation to an injured person?
While this note is concerned with the problems created by the
apparent emasculation of the municipality's zoning power, it must be
kept in mind that perhaps this was not the intended aim of Spence,
J.; rather, he may have been attempting to arrive at a solution that
would satisfactorily compensate the land owner for his loss. However,
by making such a decision, the court has left open the possibility
that individual development will proceed at the expense of town
planning.
The case involves a particular parcel of land being left unzoned
in a town plan by reason of a fault or ambiguity in the master zoning
laws. The land in question was zoned for single family uses in 1936
under City of Ottawa By-law 8214. Shortly thereafter By-law 8214
was amended by By-law 8255 which reduced the area zoned for single
family use. As a result, the particular parcel in question was left
unzoned, falling into the category of land previously zoned but now
located outside the sphere of the latter by-law. The area remained in
this state until March of 1963 when By-law 68-63 incorporated an
official plan for Ottawa. This by-law zoned the lands to allow apartment uses but by section 112 of the by-law certain prior restricted
use areas were to continue. The restricted use areas that were to
continue were found in Schedule A of the by-law, which included the
area created by By-law 8214. The Schedule did not refer to By-law
8255 (the subsequently smaller restricted area) and therefore it
remained to be determined exactly which restricted area the city
wished to be continued when it established its zoning plan in the
spring of 1963. Did the city mean the larger area of By-law 8214 or
did it wish to adopt By-law 8214 as amended to be the continuing
restrictive zone?
Following the purchase of the lands in August, 1963, the respondent company, on September 9, 1963, made an application for a permit
to erect a nine storey apartment building in the area covered by
By-law 8214 but unzoned by By-law 8255. Unfortunately the city did
not realize the ambiguity of its comprehensive zoning by-laws until
the date of this application. On learning of the proposed development
plans, certain surrounding land owners protested to the Ottawa Planning Board. There was a discrepancy in the affidavit evidence of the
president of Boyd Builders and that of the Board of Control as to the
exact location of the land of these objectors. Since this discrepancy
was not resolved, and in that it bears relation to the character of
the area, it shall be discussed later.4 Following these protests, apparently with no notice to Boyd Builders, the Ottawa Planning Board
4

See p. 8.
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held a meeting on September 18 and passed a resolution that the uses
in the disputed area be specifically restricted to family residences.5
This advice was conveyed to the Board of Control which recommended to City Council that By-law 68-63 should be amended "to
clarify and amend the zoning in view of the fact that By-law 8214 was
subsequently repealed by By-law 8255 and that this fact was not
brought before council at the date of the enactment of By-law 68-63,
and council therefore acted on the assumption that the area was protected as to zoning and use by By-law 8214."6
The following day (September 19) the City Council, again without any notice to Boyd Builders, adopted the recommendation and
passed By-law 311-63 which specifically restricted the area to single
family uses. The council directed the City Building Inspector to refuse
a permit to Boyd Builders, and immediately sent notice to the Ontario
Municipal Board that it was applying for approval of By-law 311-63.
On September 30, the company launched a mandamus for the permit
and the motion was heard on October 8 by Schatz, J. At that time the
learned judge decided to adjourn the mandamus pending the decision
of the Ontario Municipal Board.
The company appealed and the Ontario Court of Appeal7 held
that the company was entitled to the mandamus and that the judge
had erred in adjourning the matter. The City's appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada was dismissed, Spence, J. affirming that the mandamus ought not to be adjourned.
Spence, J., in his reasons, relied heavily on the decision of Roach,
J.A. in the Court of Appeal. This decision, in turn, rested on the
earlier judgment of Roach, J.A. in Hammond v. City of Hamilton.8
In that case Roach, J.A., after a thorough examination of relevant
decisions, held that the owner has a prima facie right to utilize his
property in whatever manner he deems fit, subject only to the rights
of surrounding owners, nuisance, etc. This prima facie right may be
defeated or superseded by rezoning if three prerequisites are established by the municipality. Firstly, there must be a clear intent to
restrict or zone (usually manifest by the passing of a by-law) before
the hearing of the mandamus. Secondly, it must be shown the council
has proceeded in good faith, and thirdly, that the council has proceeded with dispatch.
Dealing with the first prerequisite, that there be a clear intent
to restrict or zone, it is important to note the exact date by which
the council must have manifested a clear intent to restrict the use
of land. What is to be the cut-off point for the vesting of these prima
facie rights-the date of hearing the mandamus, or the date of
application for the permit? In this case, Spence, J. clearly states that
the cut-off point is to be the date of applying for the building permit.
The learned judge's reasons, however, were based on Roach, J.A.'s
5 Note that the recommendation did not involve the restriction of uses
on the land of Boyd Builders only, but included a much larger area.
6 Supreme Court of Canada Evidence, Exhibit "B", affidavit of Alfred
Hastey, Special Report of the Board of Control.
7

8

[1964] 2 O.R. 269.

[19543 O.R. 209 at 221.
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decision in the Court of Appeal, which in turn relied on his decision
in the Hammond case. Although in the Hammond case Roach, J.A.
did not definitely state the date as being that of the hearing, he cited
with approval a decision of Orde, J., which interpreted the views of the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as expressed in the Toronto
Separate Schools case.9 In the Upper Canada Estates case, 10 Orde, J.
stated that the question of respective rights did not fall to be dealt
with as of the date of application and deposit of plans, but was to be

decided as of the date when the question comes before the court for

its adjudication. Thus it has been stated and clearly followed in

Ontario that the relevant time for the testing of rights is the date of
hearing the mandamus.
Perhaps the view of Spence, J., that the date is that of application,
is derived from his earlier decision in Re Markity and Fort Erie."
However, if this is the case, the learned justice appears to have later
reversed such an opinion in his decision in Re Granada Investments
Ltd. v. Toronto12 where, in granting an adjournment of a mandamus,
Spence, J. noted that he had found no prima facie right, and even if
such a right existed, he would exercise his discretion and adjourn
the mandamus in that a by-law had been passed prior to the date
of the hearingof the mandamus.
The most reasoned opinion suggesting that the date of the hearing is to govern comes from the Privy Council in the Toronto Separate
Schools case, 13 where Viscount Cave, L.C. stated:
It was true rights existed until the restricting by-law was passed, but
the whole object (of the present Ontario Planning Act s. 30(7))14 empowered the city acting in good faith to put restrictions on that right
and the status of the owner is limited by the power of the city to be
exercised for the protection of his neighbours.
This statement should be read in conjunction with the decision of
the Supreme Court of Canada in CanadianPetrofinaLtd. v. PR Martin

and City of St. LambertI5 where Fauteux, J. stated:

. . . the appellant (land owner) contention was that it had an accrued
right which could not be defeated by the subsequent by-law... the merit
of this proposition is, I think, completely negatived by the reasoning of
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (referring to the Toronto
Separate Schools case) . . . what was stated by Viscount Cave may be
stated concisely as follows; ...

the whole object and purpose of a zoning

statutory power is to empower the municipal authority to put restrictions,
in the general public interest, upon the right which a land owner, unless
and until the power is implemented, would otherwise have to erect upon
his land such buildings as he thinks proper. Hence the status of a land
owner per se cannot affect the operation of a by-law implementing the
statutory power without defeating the statutory power itself. Prior to the
passing of such a by-law the proprietary rights of a land owner are then
insecure in the sense that they are exposed to any restrictions which the
city, acting within its statutory power may impose.
9 City of Toronto v. Trustees of Roman CathoiicSeparate SchooZs, [1926]
A.C. 81.
10 Re Upper Canada Estates Ltd. and MacNicol, supra, footnote 3.
11 [1951] O.W.N. 836.

12 [1955) O.W.N. 517, at 520.
13 SeparateSchoos, supra,footnote 10, at 81 and 86.
14 R.S.O. 1960, c. 296.
15 [1959] S.C.R. 453, at 458.
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From this it follows that, while the right to erect includes the right
to receive the necessary permit for the erection of the building proposed
to be erected in conformity with the law in force for the time being, the
latter right is not any more secure than the former to which it Is Incidental, and if the insecurity attending this incidental right has not been
removed by the granting of the permit, by the municipal authority
acting in good faith, as in the present case, such a right cannot become
an accrued right, effective to defeat a subsequently adopted zoning by-law
prohibiting the erection of the purposed building in the area affected.

Thus it is submitted that the first prerequisite for granting of
an adjournment be that the municipality has manifested a clear
intent to restrict the land prior to the hearing of the mandamus. If
the municipality is required to have a clear intent as of the date of

application this would imply a necessary change in the present
attitude towards zoning and would involve wide reaching zoning

freezes in order to implement some intent concerning zoning before
the land owner applied for his permit. Perhaps a certain degree of
"freezing" should be employed to stabilize the zoning process and
allow individuals to start developing from a common denominator,

subject only to the later zoning amendments of council. Quaere:
whether council could ever win the race or would zoning become

stagnant?
The circumstances of these cases present a

conflict between

differing policies. In deciding the relevant date at which to test
the rights of the competing parties, the court must realize that it
is deciding between two zoning procedures.

Firstly, if the date of

application is to govern, then zoning may possibly proceed on an
individual basis in that the municipality, unless it develops overall
zoning freezes, will consistently lose the race to the land owner. If,
however, the date of the hearing governs, then the municipality
will be able to develop zoning requirements on a continual and
changing basis. Such a decision involves the selection of the best
suited policy. If the courts should be rendering such a decision at all,

they should place the greatest emphasis on the planning procedure as
established by a legislature which was competently advised. For the
courts to intervene strictly on the basis of legal opinion is perhaps
to allow the courts to make a decision for which it is not at all
16
qualified.
16 As mentioned earlier, it must be remembered that the court's legal
opinion was perhaps calculated, not so much to stagnate the zoning process,
but was concerned rather with the due compensation of the detrimental
reliance undertaken by the land owner.
For this reason Spence, J. set the date for the vesting of rights as that
of the date of application for a permit. By such a decision the use became
non-conforming at that date and could claim the protection offered by s. 30(7)
of the Planning Act.
Such an approach has in reality over-compensated the land owner and
has thwarted the development of the zoning process. Zoning was not intended
to be a singular isolated action but rather a continuing mosaic which would
reflect the needs of a planned society. If Spence, J.'s decision is to be interpreted as the law in regard to the planning process, then as suggested, such
a decision should be left to the planners and not the courts.
If, however, this decision is to be interpreted as an attempt to recompense
a land owner for loss suffered, then perhaps a new solution is necessary. It
is suggested that if the rights of the land owner as against the zoning
(Footnotecontinued on next page]
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Two of the prerequisites of Roach, J.A. remain to be considered.
The facts of the case indicate that the municipality proceeded with
the requisite dispatch. Here the City of Ottawa sent notice to the
Ontario Municipal Board that it was applying for approval of By-law
311-63, on the day following the passing of that by-law. The Ontario
Municipal Board hearing was to be on November 8. This would
seem to be almost conclusive evidence of dispatch.
The major hurdle for the municipality to overcome was that it
must have proceeded in good faith. It has been a challenging task
to extract from the present judicial quagmire just what is meant by
"good faith", who is to be the judge of it and is there a new test
or level of good faith. It would appear from Spence, J.'s decision that
a secondary form of good faith has evolved, one which is not based
on former criteria but rather one which presents a wider test of
proper procedure. If Spence, J. meant to formulate such a new
creature it may have been more expedient for the court to clearly
state such an intent, for as it now stands the existing test of good
faith does not clearly fit the factual circumstances of the Boyd case.
It has been clear from past cases that in a motion to quash a
by-law an allegation of bad faith referred to the procedure of members
of council. It has long been the practice that only operations of
municipal council are open to review:
[A] Municipal council is a legislative body having delegated and limited
jurisdiction. When it has acted within its jurisdiction the court cannot
interfere... the justness and fairness of its actions cannot be questioned
by the court ...when it goes beyond its jurisdiction or it is shown that
members of council are corruptly seeking to advance by municipal legislation their own ends, or those of a favoured individual, the court may
interfere.17
Later in the Re Howard and Re Sweet 18 cases Martin, J.A. continued
to state:
power of the municipality are to become vested or protected as of the date of
application, then such rights by the act of application have become a
non-conforming use, in that they are immune to subsequent restrictive
legislation. Thus, in refusing the permit at the date of application, the municipality should realize that the land owner has a vested right as of that date
but should be allowed to continue to enact its zoning plan which will
deprive the land owner of that right. The municipality should have the
power to deprive the owner of such a status because status alone should
not defeat the statutory zoning process. However, the municipality should
realize that a loss has been suffered and should be prepared to offer compensation in that the loss was due to the reliance placed on the municipality's
prior zoning laws.
It is difficult to discern exactly how the land owner ought to be compensated in that he has no contractual rights to enforce and the possibility
of connecting an order of compensation to the application for mandamus
appears to be remote. Therefore, it is suggested that the municipality recognize that the accrued rights amount to a non-conforming use and then the
municipality could proceed to expropriate this non-conforming use under
s. 30(6) of the Planning Act. Such a procedure would allow the municipality
to protect its zoning process and at the same time provide compensation for
the land owner. This solution unfortunately opens up the difficult problem of
valuation on expropriation, but such an issue cannot be discussed at this time.
17 Re Howard and City of Toronto; Re Sweet and City of Toronto, 61
O.L.R. 563.
18 Ibid.
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Unless the illegality complained of appears on the face of the by-law
or the statutory prerequisites to exercising jurisdiction have not been
fulfilled ... the court has a discretion to refuse to quash and as a matter
of discretion the court ought not to interfere with the construction of a
work within the competence of council save in very exceptional circumstances ... the power of council must be exercised bona fide and action
of its members must not be founded upon fraud, oppression or improper
motives. 19
Thus it would appear that bad faith consists in improper actions
on the part of council members. In the Boyd case, however, such
ingredients were not present; rather the land owner relied solely
on the fact that he had not been notified of council's impending
actions. This, standing by itself, was alleged to amount to bad faith
on the part of council.
It should be noted, however, that although notice is a relevant
factor, it is not conclusive, and the lack of such by itself is not
prima facie bad faith. 20 in the Howard and Sweet cases Mastin, J.A.
felt it proper and courteous that notice be given but held that the real
test of good faith involved indirect motives and in the absence of such
he could not find mala fides. In a concurring judgment Rowell, J.A.
stated that the court should interfere if it were shown that the
municipal councillors had abandoned all honest attempts at legislation and were completely seeking the prostitution of their legislative
powers to advance the ends of some members of council or some
21
favoured individual.
It was stated by Spence, J., relying on the judgment of Roach,
J.A. in the Court of Appeal,2 2 that the express purpose of By-law
311-63 was to defeat Boyd Builders' right to a permit and for that
reason council was taking sides and acting in bad faith. If council
were taking sides their actions might well be set aside. In Be Bridgeman v. City of Toronto23 McRuer, C.J.H.C. held that if the city were
taking sides or proceeding otherwise than in the ordinary exercise
of its function, then the mandamus ought not to be adjourned. However, interfering with council's discretion as to public interest is a
different matter. Spence, J. himself stated in the Granada Investments case:
It is always possible to attempt to allege that any legislative body was
moved too much by noisy protests from particular persons appearing
before them, but I do not think24a court should be called upon to determine
the wisdom of council's action.
The criteria to decide whether council is taking sides involves
restrictions enacted against a particular individual and not merely
the fact that the individual's land falls in a restricted area. The
respondent company contended that bad faith was to be determined
solely on the time when the municipality decided to act. But is this,
by itself, a satisfactory criteria? Surely the more fundamental test
19 mbid., 574.
20
21
22

Ibid., 577.

Ibid., 580.

[1964] 2 O.R. 269.

23 [1951] O.W.N. 472, at 473.
24

Re GranadaInvestments Ltd. v. Toronto, [1955] O.W.N. 517, at 520.
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involves a consideration of the direction in which the restrictions were
aimed, and not the time when they were enacted. If the by-law were
directed to prohibit an individual's particular commercial use in an
area, while expressly permitting other commercial uses, then this
would appear to be bad faith or discrimination. Such was held by
Gale, J. in Be Skyway Drive-In Theatres Ltd. v. Township of London25
where the learned justice refused to adjourn a mandamus in that the
by-law was passed expressly to defeat the owner of the drive-in,
without regard to the protection of the area involved. Thus, the
council was taking sides, not merely because the decision favoured
one side (this is the result of any decision) but because the council
was stating a belief that was conceived prior to the issue being
decided. This was not a decision pertaining to land use but rather
concerned with a specific land user.
Can the same be said of By-law 311-63; was it directed against
Boyd Builders alone? Council did not act on any personal motives
but adopted a recommendation of the Ottawa Planning Board. The
evidence before the court presented the issue of whether the Planning
Board acted on protests of owners within 300 feet of Boyd's lot or on
protests within 300 feet of the area involved. The Planning Board's
report stated that it received a petition from the majority of land
owners within 300 feet of the area 26 affected by By-law 311-63. The
affidavit of the president of Boyd Builders stated that the Board had
acted on petitions from only the area within 300 feet of his lot;
therefore, the by-law was directed to prohibit only his land use
and not to maintain the area land use. If this issue had been resolved
it might have aided the decision with regard to the intentions of
council. It should be noted that on cross-examination the president
admitted that the area re-zoned contained a considerable number of
properties not owned by his company. It appears that the complaint
was not so much that this area alone was singled out for restriction
but the time at which the restriction was imposed .27
Even if it were found that the council was acting in bad faith
in not notifying Boyd Builders of its actions, is such conduct reviewable by the courts on a motion for mandamus? The lack of good
faith and the consequential illegality of the by-law can certainly be
reviewed in a motion to quash a by-law, but should this conduct be
scrutinized via mandamus? In Joy Oil v. Gillies28 Rowell, J.A., in
reserving judgment on a mandamus until proceedings were taken
by direct action to quash the by-law, stated:
Re the importance of the question it would be reasonable and convenient
that the validity of these sections should be tested in proceedings directly
attacking their validity.
The ultimate question still remains whether it is the function
of the court or an administrative agency to judge the correctness of
the council's by-laws. The Ontario legislature via the Planning Act
25
26
27
28

[1947J O.W.N. 489, at 490.
Supreme Court of Canada Evidence, Boyd Builders case, p. 41.
Ibid., p. 28.
11937] 2 D.L.R. 559, at 560.
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s. 30(9), (10)29 has established that by-laws of this type are not to be
effective until approved by the Ontario Municipal Board. Further
the Ontario Municipal Board Act s. 9230 has given the Board jurisdiction to decide on any factual matters (good faith) within its
competence, and such a decision is to be binding and conclusive. In
addition to these powers, s. 35 of the Municipal Board Act has
decreed that the Board is to have exclusive jurisdiction over matters
conferred on the Board by that Act or by any other act of the legislature (i.e. Planning Act s. 30(9), (10)). It is submitted that the
legislature intended that the Ontario Municipal Board was to be the
first review tribunal with provision for a further appeal. 31 The
Municipal Act s. 27732 also provides that a resident may apply to
a Supreme Court judge to quash a by-law for illegality. Thus it
would appear that there are two methods of attack open to the land
owner and by not directly moving to quash he should then wait the
decision of the Municipal Board and finally appeal if not satisfied
with the legality of the proceedings.
In commenting on this "functional principle", whether it is
within the jurisdiction of the courts or elected council to decide on
the correctness of by-laws, Ferguson, J.A. in adjourning the mandamus in the Court of Appeal decision in the Separate Schools case,
stated:
The city council is elected by the people and better qualified to pass on
any question whether or not the erection ought, in the light of all
surrounding
circumstances, to be permitted, than any judge could possibly be.3 3
Remember also that Spence, J. himself stated earlier:
But I do not think a court should be called upon to determine the wisdom
of council's action. It should simply leave it to the ordinary democratic
process for the council 34to be responsible to the ratepayers who elected
members of the council.
The Supreme Court of Canada has expressly commented on this
functional principle where in Kuchma v. Rural Municipality of Tachex
Esty, J. stated:
Upon the question of public interest the courts have recognized that the
municipal
council, familiar with local conditions, is in the best position
of
parties
to determine
what
or decision
what is unless
not in good
the public
interest
and sufficient
withis its
andallhave
refused
to interfere
5
reason interest
be established
. . . immediately
connected
with the question of
public
is the allegation
of bad faith.3

It would appear that council and not the court is in a better
position to decide on zoning by-laws. The problem of granting a
mandamus in these cases is that the developer is setting the zoning
standards in conflict with those expressed by the local representatives.
29 R.S.O. 1960 c. 296.

30 Ibid., c. 274.
31 Ibid., c. 274, s. 95(1).

32 Ibid., c. 249.

33 Toronto v. The Roman Catholic Separate Schools (1920-21), 21 O.W.N.
17, at 18.
34 Re GranadaInvestments Ltd., loc. cit., supra,footnote 24.
35 [1945] S.C.R. 234, at 243.
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Spence, J.'s comments in the Boyd case indicate that it was scarcely
contemplated that the Ontario Municipal Board would subsequently
approve By-law 311-63 in view of the court's decision.36 If the by-law
fails to get Board approval or if approved and the affected land is
exempted from its operation, the land owner in either case is pursuing a zoning standard contrary to the intended plan.
Here indeed there is a race and if the council were to find itself
in a tight situation, having refused a permit because it wishes to
protect the status it must act quickly to prevent "grave hardship
and detriment" from besetting the area. On the facts council reacted
quickly, not notifying the land owner of its actions, but acted to
preserve the character of an area it believed (from reports of the
Planning Board and the Board of Control) should be protected. The
municipality also argued that it was clarifying its own previously
approved by-law. This purpose clearly was stated in the Report of
the Board of Control and can be inferred from the inherent ambiguity
of Schedule A of By-law 68-63. There was no evidence of maZa fides
with regard to this claim by the council. A similar claim was before
the Supreme Court in the Canadian Petrofina case where Fauteux
stated:
That the city was acting in bad faith is not supported. The declared
purpose of the by-law is to remove any possible ambiguity,
as to its
37
interpretation as invariably given in the past by the city.
Was the City of Ottawa merely trying to clear up an ambiguity
that existed due to the context of Schedule A or was it trying to
pass new legislation with regard to land use? The fact that By-law
8214 was subsequently amended in By-law 8255 did not vitiate the
clear intent of council that the area encompassed by By-law 8214 was
to continue as a restricted use zone. The existence of By-law 8255 presented the possibility of a different interpretation of council's intent
and should not by itself38decide that council's intent was merely to
restrict this smaller area.
In such a tight situation the council must decide whether to
give notice to all of a public hearing, allowing the land owner the
opportunity to advance his mandamus and win the race or to pass
the by-law without notice. Sacrificing the requirement of notice the
municipality at least stays in the race and the land owner can still
object at the Municipal Board level. It is suggested that this latter
method was contemplated by the legislature. The by-law requires
the Board's approval and all interested parties must then be notified
and afforded a full hearing. If it is then found from the land owner's
evidence that the council has not acted in the best interests of the
36 [19651 S.C.R. 408; see also Be Bridgeman v. Toronto, [1951] O.W.N.
472, where following the report is a letter from the O.M.B. declining to
approve a by-law discredited by the court.
37 [1959] S.C.R. 453, at 457.
38 Sun Oil Company Ltd. v. Town of 'Whitby, [1957] O.W.N. 362. Laidlaw,
J.A. expressly noted that council in this case was not contemplating a
municipal plan which would prohibit the erection of service stations at that
time and place. Could it be said that Ottawa had a plan which contemplated
the restriction on land use and was merely trying to clarify it?
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community, the by-law will be refused and the builder is entitled to
his permit. But if it be found that the council has acted in the public
interest, all circumstances being considered, then the character of
the area has been validly protected. When a party's rights are affected
justice demands that he be given the opportunity of stating his
position. Must this opportunity always precede action by the municipal authority? Perhaps the weight of the possible detriment to the
area is so great that policy considerations suggest that the hearing
be after the municipality's action, allowing the municipality to keep
a foot in the door. From Roach, J.A.'s prerequisites, if the council has
not acted by the date of the mandamus hearing, then it would be
impossible to refuse the application and the race would be lost to
the developer. Proceeding on the concept that a full hearing is
afforded the land owner at the Municipal Board, the developer has
not lost the possibility of protecting his status and at the same time
the municipality can attempt to protect actions which it feels are in
the public interest. Such a procedure appears to have been expressly
approved in Ontario by Wells, J. in Re Loblaws Groceteria Co. Ltd.
v. Town of Brockville39 where, finding no animus toward the land
owner himself, granted an adjourment of a mandamus and stated:
It would seem to me what has to be considered here is the general interest
of the inhabitants of Brockville, as evidenced by the decision of council,
and the right of the appellant company, and that these rights are in the
process of being dealt with in the normal course of events by the
Municipal Board, and that until that has been done, the courts
should
not intervene, especially by so drastic a remedy as mandamus. 40
Here the courts have sought to interfere in the normal process
and have developed a concept of bad faith resulting from lack of
notice alone. Lack of notice itself has been previously held not to
amount to bad faith.4 1 However, by placing the Boyd decision alongside the Supreme Court's decision in Wiswell v. Metropolitan Winnipeg42 it would appear that notice must not be given before council
is able to take any action, despite the fact that this requirement places
the municipality in a severely prejudicial position. Does the race
then have a foregone conclusion?
This protection of the land owner's existing status now carries
the weight that the Privy Council expressly denied to it. Spence, J.'s
decision allows the individual land owner to outrace the municipal
planners and may well open the way to individual "planning". This
position appears to have been exactly the fear that possessed
Fauteux, J. to comment in the Canadian Petrofina case:
39
40
41

at 185.

Re Lob7aws Groceteria Co. Ltd. v. Town of Brockvifle, [1955] O.R. 258.
Ibid., p. 260.
Be Wright and BurZington, [1959] O.R. 183 (Ont. C.A.), Schroeder, J.A.

42 (1965) 51 D.L.R. (2d) 754 (S.C.C.) in which failure to post notice of
a hearing on land involved, as required by Winnipeg's own procedural requirements, was sufficient to vitiate the by-law. The court commented that
the lack of notice as required was sufficient to void the by-law and they did
not have to deal with the allegations of bad faith and lack of public
interest. Both the trial court and the C.A. found good faith and public
interest, so it is interesting to note how Spence, J. connects mere lack of
notice (even with no procedural requirement) with allegation of bad faith.

